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Leverage Ratios
Uses and Limitations of Leverage Ratios
CHANGES in a sector's net worth, as was pointed out earlier, consist
essentially of saving and capital gains; the changing shares of these two
sources of net worth gains were discussed in Chapter 6. Capital gains
themselves can be resolved into two parts: the gains that would have
resulted from holding the original assets throughout the whole period
and a residual consisting of gains (or losses) on assets acquired or
sold during the period. Included in the second part are such items as
capital gains on newly purchased assets between the time of purchase
and the end of the period and, in the case of assets sold, the difference
between realized capital gains and the unrealized gains that would
have accrued if the assets had been held.
The relative importance of the two types of capital gain depends on
the length of the period. The shorter it is, the greater is the importance
of the initial asset structure. Other factors bearing on the extent to
which capital gains can be explained in terms of the original structure
of the balance sheet are the ratio of saving to initial net worth and the
extent of shifting between monetary and price-sensitive assets and
among price-sensitive assets.
This chapter is concerned with the part Of capital gains that can be
explained in terms of initial asset holdings and hence with the structure
of the balance sheet. That structure is summarized here by the leverage
ratio—the ratio of the proportional rise in net worth to the propor-
tional rise in asset prices which causes it. Since it is derived from the
initial balance sheet, the leverage ratio is a measure of potential, rather
than actual, capital gain. In conjunction with actual or projected price
changes, leverage ratios yield estimates of past and hypothetical future
net worth changes and carry the analysis of these a step further than
was possible in Chapter 6. For the major sectors, over a sixty-year
period, we can examine the stability of leverage ratios and the extent
to which they, combined with the price indexes of Chapter 7, account
for the observed changes in net worth. For various other divisions of
the economy, they provide estimates of the impact of price changes on
net worth even where these cannot be checked against actual net worth
changes. For the future, or for other cases where the change in price is
not known, leverage ratios suggest the effects of possible changes in
price—pointing out which groups might be vulnerable to, or favored
by, price changes of various types.
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The limitations of the leverage ratio must be kept in mind. Since
it is a characteristic of initial balance sheets, it takes no account of shifts
in the structure of a balance sheet within a period, even when these
shifts result from the very price changes being studied. And because
asset prices do differ greatly at times, the net worth of a sector depends
not only on asset prices in general but also on the particular prices of
its own which the leverage ratio by itself does not take
account of.
THE BASIC ARITHMETIC
In this chapter. saving and shifts among assets within periods are
ignored; attention is centered on initial asset holdings and the effect
of price changes on them and on net worth. This section sets out some
of the relationships between price and net worth changes that follow
from this approach.
The following symbols are used:
A—valueof total assets.
Mvalue of monetary assets.
S =valueof price-sensitive assets.
D =debt.
W =networth.
0beginning of period (end of preceding period).
I =endof period.
achange in price of price-sensitive assets (obtained by subtracting
1 from the asset price indexes in Chapter 7).
d =ratioof debt to total assets.











The leverage ratio has been defined as the ratio of the relative change
'9%INFLUENCE OF PRICE CHANGES ON NET WORTH
in net worth(Wi —W0to the relative change in price (a), and can
'S /
thereforebe expressed, from equations (4) and (5), as:
L =S0= s0= —M0=A0—M0
(6)
W0 1 —d0 An— W0 W0
The leverage ratio can be seen to depend only on the base-date relation-
ship of debt and price-sensitive assets to total assets or, even more
simply, on the ratio of price-sensitive assets to net worth. The higher
the share of price-sensitive assets and the proportion of debt to assets,
the higher is the leverage ratio, i.e., the larger the proportionate effect
on net worth of a given rate of change in the average price of price-
sensitive assets. A leverage ratio of 2, for example, indicates that an
increase in price-sensitive asset prices of 10 per cent over the period of
measurement will result in an increase in net worth of 20 per cent.1
Calculation of the leverage ratio presupposes a classification of total
assets into at least two classes, price-sensitive and price-insensitive
(monetary) assets. For some purposes, all assets other than currency,
demand and time deposits with financial institutions (including shares
in saving and loan associations and in credit unions), short-term (one
year or less) securities with a fixed maturity value, and cash surrender
value of life insurance policies may be regarded as price sensitive.
For other purposes, the class of price-insensitive assets may be enlarged
to include either all claims with fixed maturity value other than
marketable securities with a maturity of more than one year or all
fixed-maturity-value claims, i.e., all receivables, deposits, loans, and
11n the relatively few published studies of the effect of asset price changes on net
worth, use is often made of the difference between monetary (price-insensitive)
assets and liabilities. This difference (net monetary assets), expressed as a proportion
of total assets, is equal to (1 —s0)—d0,and of course may be positive or negative.
The relationship between net monetary assets as a percentage of total assets (symbol
n) and the leverage ratio then is
n=(1—d0) (1—L).
The formula used by Aichian and Kessel (Science, September 4, 1959, p. 586)to
measure the effect of inflation on the net worth of corporations (net worth, how-
ever, defined as the market value of the corporation's shares rather than adjusted




In other words, the Alchian.Kessel ratio (1'the ratio of net monetary debt to equity
as measured by the market price of shares times the number of shares outstanding")
is the same as the leverage ratio less unity, if the difference in the method of
measuring equity is ignored.
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bonds. The purpose of the analysis will determine the scope given to
assets that are price sensitive and insensitive. In. particular, the rougher
the figures needed and the shorter the period covered, the larger may
be the scope of assets treated as price insensitive.
If both the leverage ratio and the change in asset prices are known,







Theserelationships are illustrated by two simple examples in Table 48.2
Thedichotomy of price-sensitive and, price-insensitive assets will not
generally satisfy the analyst's requirements because there is consider-
able variability among price movements. At the least, three classes of
price-sensitive assets have to be distinguished: tangible assets, corporate
stock(possibly including equity in unincorporated business enter-
prises and in cooperative and mutual organizations), and long-term
claims (including preferred stock). A still finer breakdown of price-
sensitive assets, particularly of tangibles, is often necessary and feasible.
If more than one class of price-sensitive assets is distinguished, the
calculation can proceed in two ways, which lead to the same result. The
first is to use a weighted average of changes in asset prices (a).Ifthe
symbol a1 is used for the rate of price change for any given class of price-
sensitive assets and the symbolfor the share of this class in total assets,
and ifindicates summing for all classes of price-sensitive assets, then
-a_
2The calculation of the leverage ratio and its application in deriving the absolute
change in net worth are not affected by the fact that in some cases, as, for instance,
the federal government after World War II, net worth is negative. In that case the
leverage ratio itself will have a negative value, but the change in net worth will
be positive when asset prices increase since the negative leverage ratio is applied
to a negative initial net worth figure. This is illustrated in the example below.
Beginning of Period End of Period
Cash 25Debt 800Cash 25 Debt 800
Real estate 75Net worth —200Real estate 150Net worth—125
Leverage ratio' — .375.75 —— 2.00
Increase in asset price1.00
Change in net worth+ 75 =(— .875X —200)
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TABLE 48
ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF CALCULATION OF LEVERAGE RATIO
Beginning of Period End of Periods
ONE PRICE-SENSITIVE ASSET
1. Cash 254. Debt 501. Cash 254. Debt 50
2. Real estate 755. Net worth502. Real estate1505. Net worth125
3. Total assets1006. Total" 1003. Total assets1756. Total" 175
Leverage ratio (L) = 1.50
Price change (a) =1.00
Increase in net worth
Relative(W1W0=aL)=1.00X 1.50 =1.50
Absolute (W1 —W0—aLW0)=50X 1.50 =15
Net worth ratio = 1+aL)=1.50+ 1 =2.50
TWOPRICE-SENSITIVEASSETS
1. Cash 255. Debt 501. Cash 255. Debt 50
2. Real estate 256. Net worth502. Real estate 506. Net worth175
3. Stocks 50 3. Stocks 150
4. Total assets1007. Total assets2257. TotaL" 225
.75
Leverage ratio = = 1.50
Increase in net worth
Relative =1.67X 1.50 =2.50
Absolute =50X 2.50 =125
Net worth ratioc =175÷50=
Prices of real estate are assumed to double over the period and those of stock
to triple.
"Liabilities and net worth.
Ratio of net worth at end of period to net worth at beginning of period.
The second approach is to express the leverage ratio as the sum of
similar ratios for the different classes of price-sensitive assets. If S1, S2...
indicate the current value of the different classes of price-sensitive










1(1 — d0)+ a1 s01 +s02 ++ a,,
— l—d0 I
—+
a1 s01 + a2 S02 +...+a,, s0,,
(13)
FV0 — l—d0
Up to this point the discussion has involved current dollar net worth.
Often, however, one wishes to know not whether the dollar value of net
worth has increased but whether it has increased more than the price
level—in other words, whether there has been any gain in the real value
of net worth. This question involves not only the change in asset prices
(a) but a measure of the change in the general price level (p), for
which we use the GNP deflator. Then, taking M0 to represent initial
monetary assets (A0 —S0),the following relationships can be. derived.
Real net worth at the end of the periol (1
W1)becomes
WI—W0+




andthe change in real net worth, in initial prices, is
—=+s0 (M0 + So—D0)+
a)
1+P '+P ('+P)
= ( —P)—D0— (a—p)
(15)
(l+p) (l+P) ('+P)




minusthe decline in the real value of liabilities
L(l+p)
plusthe differential gain in the real value of price-sensitive assets.
(a—p)
L('+P)
The last term disappears if asset price changes are identical to those
in the general price level.
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Relative changes in real net worth can be conveniently expressed in
terms of the leverage ratio.
W1/(1 + p) 1+





which, when ap. becomes
(L—l). (18)
(1+p)
The ratio of real net worth change to the change in the general price








L—1 Both of these reduce to when the two price indexes are equal.
1+p
These might be referred to as "real" leverage ratios, since they show
the relation of the change in real net worth to price changes, but they
differ from the leverage ratio(L)in that they include the price
changes—they are functions of the price changes.
The condition for keeping real net worth intact can be described as
that L =0,or thatWi! (1 + 1. This condition requires that
p wo
aL—p.In other words, if the changes in asset prices and the general
price level are equal, a leverage ratio of 1 will maintain the real value
of net worth. If asset prices fall behind a rise in the price level, a larger
leverage ratio will be required; if they rise more than the price level,
as has more frequently been the case, a leverage ratio below 1 will
suffice. In any case, both the leverage ratio and the movement of asset
prices must be taken into account in estimating the impact of price
changes on real net worth.
The amount of net worth determined from a group or national
balance sheet depends, of course, on the method of valuation adopted,
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and on the choice between combination or consolidation of the balance
sheets of the Units belonging to the group.3
The leverage ratio, like the change in net worth, therefore, is affected
by the choice between consolidated and combined balance sheets. In a
combined balance sheet characterized by intragroup ownership of
stock, total assets, price-sensitive assets, and net worth are all higher
than in a consolidated one by the same absolute amount (provided
consistent valuations are used). The leverage ratio is therefore lower on
a consolidated than on a combined basis, the size of the difference de-
pending on the proportion of intragroup stock holdings to the value
of price-sensitive assets and of debt. The leverage ratio is unaffected if
the intragroup holdings are in monetary (price-insensitive) form.
In a closed national economy, the leverage ratio is always equal to
unity if consistent valuations are used, i.e., if an asset or liability is
carried at the same value in the balance sheets of the creditor and
the debtor and if a stock is entered at the same value in the balance
sheet of the holder and of the issuer. If, as will be the case in actual life
but not necessarily in social accounting, valuations are not consistent,
particularly for equity securities, the national leverage ratio will differ
from unity, and the size of the difference will depend primarily on the
difference between the market value of common stock and its adjusted
book value.4
8These differences have been illustrate4 in the simplified example of Table 23.
Two points may be worth recalling. First, consolidated net worth will always be
smaller than combined net worth if there are intragroup holdings of equities.
Secondly, while assets are always equal to the sum of liabilities and net worth on a
combined basis (provided that the balance sheets being combined were in balance,
as they must have been if taken from each unit's set of books, no matter what
valuation basis may have been used), this is not the case if consolidated group or
national balance sheets are used. There the valuation of the intragroup claims or
equities will, as a rule, differ between the balance sheets of the two members
involved. Hence, total consolidated assets will differ from the sum of total consoli-
dated liabilities and net worth. It is only if all units carry intragroup holdings of
equity securities (or claims) consistently on the basis of the market values of these
securities, their adjusted book value, or some other value adopted by both parties
that such a valuation difference will be absent. This means either issuers of
securities calculate net worth on the basis of the market valuation of their stock,
or that owners of equity securities carry them at a constructive value that can
only be derived from the issuer's adjusted balance sheet valuations. Both assump-
tions are in contrast to the basic rules of business accounting and will never
actually be met. But they can, and must, be used in a consistent system of national
accounts.
4 formulationapplies to a national balance sheet in which stockholders con-
sistently value their common stock at market price while corporate net worth is
calculated as the difference between the current (replacement) value of the assets
of corporations and their liabilities. If the national balance sheet is based on the
balance sheets as kept by the component units in accordance with business accounting
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In an open economy, i.e., one owning foreign assets and having lia-
bilities to foreigners and tangible assets and equity securities owned
by foreigners, the national leverage ratio need not be equal to unity
even if consistent valuations are used throughout. In this case the na-
tional leverage ratio will deviate from unity by an amount which will
be larger the greater the foreign assets and liabilities in comparison
to their domestic counterparts, and the greater the disparity in the
shares of price-sensitive items in foreign assets and liabilities. In the
United States the deviation of the national leverage ratio from unity
during the postwar period has been negligible since both foreign
assets and liabilities have accounted for no more than about 1 per cent
of domestic assets and of liabilities plus net worth.
AVAILABILITY OF DATA
Leverage ratios can be calculated wherever balance sheets are available
that permit the segregation of price-sensitive assets (and if possible
the main classes of them) from monetary assets, and the separation of
monetary liabilities from net worth. These balance sheets, however,
must be expressed in current values. Market values rather than book
values or another alternative are needed because the purpose of calcu-
lating leverage ratios is to study the effects of asset price changes on net
worth, and it is frequently in the disparity between market and book
values that these effects can be seen.
Since balance sheets of the seven main sectors distinguished in the
American economy are available in current values for six benchmark
dates between 1900 and 1939 and annually for 1945-58, there is no
difficulty in calculating leverage ratios for these dates and sectors. The
groups of economic units for which sectoral balance sheets are avail-
able are, however, very broad. It is therefore desirable, and almost
necessary, to supplement the leverage ratios derived from these sector
balance sheets with leverage ratios calculated for balance sheets of
smaller groups insofar as they are available on, or can be transformed
to, a current value basis. Such additional group balance sheets can be
derived primarily from three sources.
First, balance sheets for several main groups of corporations can be
obtained by combining estimates of the replacement cost of plant and
equipment and of the current value of inventories with book value
figures for other assets and for liabilities, estimating net worth on a
market value basis as the difference between revalued assets and ha-
methods the difference may be either larger or smaller since equity securities will
be carried in the balance sheet of the owner at book (original cost)rather than
market value, and the net worth of corporations will generally reflect orginal cost
rather than replacement cost of fixed assets.
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bilities. This approach is restricted to the period since balance sheets
for virtually all corporations became available (although on a book
value basis) through the tabulation of corporation income tax returns,
i.e., since the late 1920's. In this study only part of this material has
been used, as recources were lacking for full exploitation.
Secondly, balance sheets are available for samples of households
classified by such variables as income, net worth, Occupation, and age
of head. These are from the Survey of Consumer Finances, for 1950,
1953, and 1962, and from the Survey of Consumers Union members,
for the end of 1958. These data can be used to calculate leverage ratios
for a great variety of household types, and to estimate the relation of
leverage ratios to a number of other variables.
There are, thirdly, the estate tax returns covering estates of over
$60,000. Only for 1944 and 1958 are these data available in sufficient
detail to permit the estimation of values for the whole population of
families with assets of mOre than $60,000, a numerically small group
but one accounting for about one-third of the total net worth of all
individuals. HOwever, a comparison of the asset structure of estate tax
wealth before and after adjustment to cover living families in the
upper wealth group suggests that leverage ratios computed from the
unadjusted estate tax returns would not be very far from the adjusted
ones.
Leverage Ratios for Major Sectors
When the leverage ratio is described in terms of monetary assets and
liabilities, L
—M0it is clear that it must be dose to unity for
D0
the country as a whole. This is a result of the fact that monetary assets
equal monetary liabilities, aside from small foreign debts and claims.
For any sector of the economy, however, this need not be true. The
leverage ratio for a sector is determined by the ratio between monetary
assets and monetary. liabilities. It is above unity if liabilities exceed
monetary assets and below unity if liabilities are smaller. A sector's
leverage ratio is negative if its net worth is negative, i.e., if monetary
liabilities exceed total assets. A negative leverage ratio then indicates
that a rise in prices will bring a positive increment in net worth. The
only example of this situation among the major balance sheet sectors
was the federal government in benchmark years beginning with 1922.
Leverage ratios for the six major balance sheet sectors (Table 49
and Chart 16), aside from those for the federal government, did not
show any extreme departures from unity. The lowest was .60 (nonfarm
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Source: Table 49.INFLUENCE OF PRICE CHANGES ON NET WORTH
ments in 1933). Household ratios were consistently low, ranging from
.60 to .82, and those for nonfinancial corporations and state and local
governments were usually high. Farm leverage ratios were fairly high
before World War H but have been below unity at every benchmark
year since then. The erratic course of the ratios for unincorporated busi-
ness may represent no more than the weakness of the underlying data.
On the whole, the ranking of the sectors is fairly consistent and the
leverage ratio changes can often be accounted for by a few obvious
events. World War II, for example, noticeably reduced the leverage
ratios of all sectors but the federal government, which showed a large
rise to offset the others.
Since the leverage ratios appear to represent moderately stable char-
acteristics of some of the sectors, the next question is the extent to
which they, by themselves or in combination with price changes and
saving, account for past changes in net worth.
The leverage ratios alone do not provide much of an explanation for
sectoral net worth changes or for residual changes—that is, net worth
changes minus saving. The range of the ratios for major sectors is small
compared to the range of asset price changes, and the influence of the
leverage ratios is therefore swamped.
The two factors can, however, be combined. We can set up a very
simple model of a sector's net worth change other than saving. This
residual net worth change is assumed to depend only on the initial
leverage ratio and actual changes in asset prices, the latter combined
into an index using initial weights for the sector. The estimated ratio
of final to initial real net worth is then (from eq. 16)
aL+1
p+l,
where L is the initial leverage ratio, a is the estimated change in asset
prices with initial weights, and p is the change in the GNP deflator.
Affecting the actual change in net worth, but left out of this formula-
tion, are transfers, capital gains and losses on assets purchased during
the period, and, in general, the effects on actual price changes and
leverage ratios of switching among assets within the period. Another
reason for poor estimates is the possibly wide divergence between the
very rough sectoral price indexes of Chapter 7 and the, implicit price
indexes actually underlying asset values. From this list of omissions it
is clear that estimates of net worth change made by using (16) should
be better for short periods than for long ones and better for groups
with stable asset portfolios and ratios of liabilities to assets than for
groups whose portfolios shift widely and rapidly.
The accuracy with which the combination of the leverage ratio and
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the asset price index estimate residual net worth changes can be seen
in Table 50. In the two war periods and in all the periods after World
War II, the relationship between expected and actual residual net
worth changes was coefficient of determination (r2)being
over 85 per cent. In the other four periods, the results were not so
favorable; the relation between expected and actual changes was even
negative in two of the periods. For all periods combined, the correla-
tion was very low, mainly because of the very poor estimate for the
federal government in 1900-12. Removal of that one case raises the
coefficient of determination (r2)forthe nine periods combined to .59.
The leverage ratios for 1958 can be used, with the asset price indexes
of Chapter 7, to predict the residual net changes between 1958 and the
end of 1962, for which we have no balance sheets. These estimates sug-
gest a narrow range of changes from a 3 per cent increase for state and
local government to a 7 per cent decrease (in negative net worth) for
the federal government.
The accuracy of the later projections of net worth suggests consider-
able stability in sector leverage ratios, but one would not expect them
to remain constant over time. The fact that they contribute to the
effect of price changes on net worth implies that price changes affect
the leverage ratios themselves if no counteraction is taken. Since World
War II, the household sector as a whole and the federal government
seem to have accepted passively most of the effects of price changes on
their leverage ratios. This can be seen by comparing actual changes in
leverage ratios with projections which are made by assuming that only
asset prices affect the balance sheet.
Nonf arm Households Federal Government
Projected Actual Projected Actual
1945-49 + .045 + .060 —.064 —.061
1949-58 + .042 + .051 —.051 —.066
1953-58 + .055 + .044 —.056 —.052
In the first two periods households moved more toward higher leverage
ratios than projected, either by shifting toward price-sensitive assets
or by raising debt ratios. The projected direction of change in agricul-
tural leverage ratios was correct for all three periods, but for other
sectors there were many instances in which it was incorrect. Most of
these involved projected decreases in leverage ratio and actual in-
creases. Taking all periods and all sectors together, we find agreement
in direction in thirty-four out of fifty-four comparisons.
The much higher correlation in later periods between expected and
actual net worth changes suggests that defects in the earlier data may
have contributed to the poor correspondence. The early data for gov-
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Also, in several instances in the earlier years the rate of growth was
very large and saving was high relative to initial net worth and, there-
fore, to residual net worth changes. Capital gains or losses on newly
acquired assets or liabilities, not taken account of in the expected
values, will, in such a case, be high relative to gains or losses on initial
net worth. There is the additional danger, when saving is large in
comparison to capital gains, that small errors in the saving estimates
may cause relatively large errors in the residuals.
It is only for these very large economic sectors that we can not only
compute leverage ratios and asset price indexes but also compare the
inferred capital gains with changes in net worth and saving. Data on
tangible assets and saving are not available for smaller groups and the
shifting of units between groups becomes a more serious difficulty.5
However, the good correspondence between actual and expected
net worth changes since 1939 suggests that even the computation of
expected changes would be useful for analyzing the recent past and
future possibilities for other divisions of the business and household
population.
Leverage Ratios for Households of Different Types
SURVEY OF CONSUMER FINANCES DATA: 1950, 1953, AND 1962
Materials for calculating leverage ratios for various types of households
are available from the Survey of Consumer Finances for early 1950,
early 1953 and early 1962. The 1960 survey contained some informa-
tion on asset holdings, but its usefulness for the computation of lever-
age ratios was much reduced by the fact that house values were listed
only net of mortgage debt.°
5 additionalbreakdowns might be made, particularly in the direction of
breaking finance out of corporations and possibly dividing nonfinancial corpora-
tions into major industries. Adjusting book values to current prices presents the
main obstacle to both of these possibilities, particularly in the case of finance, where
price-sensitive assets and net worth are small compared with totalassets and
liabilities. The leverage ratios are therefore very sensitive to errors in the adjust.
ment.
6The1950 data are given,, with adjustments for life insurance and pension funds
(not included in the survey), in Goldsmith, Study of Saving, Vol. III, pp. 102 if; for
1958 data, see 1953 Survey of Consumer Finances (reprinted from the Federal Re-
serve Bulletin for March, June, July, August, and September, 1958); 1962 data
appear in 1962 Survey of Consumer Finances (Survey Research Center, University
of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1963).
Aside from the fact that several surveys are not completely comparable in
assets covered, it should be noted that all the samples understate assets and, to
a lesser degree, liabilities. It is impossible to say whether this understatement, which
is known to vary' among assets, wQuld substantially affect the level of the leverage
ratios for different types of households and, what is more important, whether it
would significantly alter relationships among leverage ratios. It is, however, quite
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A limitation of the household leverage ratios derived from the
Survey of Consumer Finances data is the combination into single
income and wealth classes of all households with incomes of over
$7,500 and all with net worth of over This aggregation pre-
vents the calculation of leverage ratios by income and wealth classes
within upper income and wealth groups.. Fortunately, this deficiency
of the data can be compensated, for wealthier families, by using the
estate tax data discussed later.
Leverage ratios for all households combined (not adjusted to cover
life insurance and pension funds) were, according to the sample data,
0.95 in early 1950, 0.96 in 1953, and 1.11 in 1962 (Table 51). The ad-
justed ratio of 0.85 in 1950 was much closer to the comparable ratio,
0.80, derived from aggregative statistics.8
The strong inverse relationship between net worth and the leverage
ratio in the unad.justed data is seen to be an illusion when the adjusted
data are examined. The poorest families(net worth under $1,000,
about 30 per cent of all families) actually had the lowest, rather than
the highest, leverage ratios. Above that level there was no clear rela-
tionship between wealth and leverage.
Income and leverage ratio were apparently not related; five of the
seven income classes showed ratios of 0.85 in adjusted data. The unad-
justed ratios, particularly in 1953, showed an increase with income,
followed by a decrease in the two highest brackets. A relationship of
very similar shape can be found in the unadjusted 1962 ratios by in-
come quintiles, which increase from the first to the fourth and then
decline. The decline takes place mainly among the top tenth of income
recipients.
possible that, in the calculation of leverage ratios, understatements of monetary
and of price-sensitive assets may largely offset each other. A comparison of survey
and aggregate data (Study of Saving, Vol. III, p. 107) shows leverage ratios of 0.86
for the former and 0.70 for the latter. Most of the difference was in the estimates
of house values; leverage ratios for common stock, an asset which varies greatly in im-
portance among income and wealth classes, are quite similar in the survey and
aggregate data. It thus appears that at least the adjusted survey data are unlikely
to contain very serious distortions in comparisons among household types. The
Survey of Consumer Finances data are derived from relatively small samples—about
5,000 households—and are subject to sampling errors as well as other errors in-
herent in inquiries of this type. These are discussed, e.g., in an article "Methods of
the Survey of Consumer Finances" in Federal Reserve Bulletin, July 1950, and in
L. Klein (ed.), Contributions of Survey Methods to Economics, New York, 1954.
7 originaltabulations distinguished a further group of households with
incomes of $7,500 to $10,000, but its loss in the published tables is not very serious
as the marked differences from the average for the group of households with in-
comes of over $7,500 would appear only at levels substantially above $10,000.
8Studyof Saving, Vol. III, p. 107. Revised aggregate leverage ratios, not recomputed
to cover only those assets included in the Survey of Consumer Finances, are sub.






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8INFLUENCE OF PRICE CHANGES ON NET WORTH
The one clear relationship which did survive the adjustment for in-
surance and retirement fund assets was that with age. Leverage ratios
were at their peak in the 25-34 age group, and declined, with age, to
the extent that spending units with heads 65 and over had total ratios
more than 25 per cent and consumer capital goods ratios 50 per cent
lower than the peak class. This age pattern presumably reflects the
importance of owners of heavily mortgaged homes in the 25-to-34 class
and the shift at later ages to mortgage-free ownership (see Chapter 12,
Part Three of this volume). The relationship between age and leverage
ratio may have been even stronger in 1962 than in earlier years, if one
can judge from the unadjusted data.
The rough uniformity of the adjusted total leverage ratios conceals
considerable variability in those for consumer goods and investment
assets. Ratios for consumer goods were inversely related to net worth
(above $1,000) and age, and those for business and investment assets
therefore positively related. The relation to income was different. Con-
sumer capital goods ratios rose with income through the $4,000-to-
4,999 dass and business asset ratios fell. But between that level and the
income class over $7,500 the relationship was drastically reversed, the
highest income class showing the lowest consumer capital ratio and
the highest business asset ratio.
This U-shape in the business component of the leverage ratio of
households is due to farm assets. If farm real estate, livestock, and
crop inventories are deducted from price-sensitive assets and net worth,
the second component of the leverage ratio is fairly stable at 0.25 for
the income groups of $2,000 to $4,999, but then increases sharply to
somewhat above one-third in the income group of $5,000 to $7,499 and
to over three-fifths in the top income group of $7,500 and over. This
reflects the increasing importance of holdings of common stock and of
equity in unincorporated business enterprises among the middle and
upper income groups.
The unadjusted survey data show very little change in the leverage
ratio between early 1950 and early 1953—even less than appears in the
aggregate data. The 1950 and 1953 surveys produced quite consistent
leverage ratios for all the variables shown. In most cases, not only the
order of the classes but the levels of the leverage ratios were quite close
in the two years. The 1962 ratio for all families, however, was con-
siderably higher than the earlier ones and rose much more than was
indicated by the aggregate data in Volume II and the Federal Reserve
Board's flow-of-funds accounts. The largest increases, by far, were in
consumer goods leverage ratios of households in the two lowest net
worth classes.
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Although some differences in leverage ratios are revealed in Table
51, the adjusted ratios cluster in a fairly narrow band. Of the thirty-one
age, income, wealth, and occupation classes, twenty-seven have adjusted
ratios between 0.74 and 0.99; the others, aside from the negative net
worth class, are 0.67, 0.71, and 1.07. It was clear from the aggregate
data that households' real net worth suffers from a rise in the price
level and the survey data reveal that households with very low net
worth tend to do somewhat worse than average and that those with
heads in the 25-to-34 age bracket tend to fare somewhat better than
average.
A greater variability in the population would be expected and it is
possible that the variables used have simply not been the ones to
reveal it. This suspicion is confirmed by Table 52, which shows that
considerable numbers of families had no price-sensitive assets at all in
1953 and one-quarter had leverage ratios below 0.50 in 1962. This is
particularly striking in view of the fact that these are unadjusted data
which, as can be seen in Table 51, grossly exaggerate some leverage
ratios, particularly for the low net worth classes. Adjustment for life
insurance and retirement funds would move many families from nega-
tive or zero net worth into low positive net worth classes at low leverage
ratios, and would lower the calculated leverage ratios for families
already in those classes. Even these unadjusted asset data show that of
all households with any net worth at all in 1953, 12 per cent had lever-
age ratios of zero, 18 per cent had ratios under 0.40, and 31 per cent
had ratios under 0.80. On the other side were a significant number (the
40 per cent for 1953 and 55 per cent for 1962 in Table 52 undoubtedly
are overestimates) of spending units with leverage ratios of 1.00 or
more.
The 1953 figures show that low net worth groups contain many
extreme leverage ratios. Of the members of the $1-499net worth class,
96 per cent had leverage ratios of zero or more than 1.0, as did 87 per
cent of those in the $500-999 class. In the two highest net worth classes,
43 and 53 per cent of the households had unadjusted leverage ratios
between 0.80 and 0.99.
It would be of interest to know what characteristics, outside of their
balance sheet, distinguish those households in a position to gain from
price increases from those whose real net worth could be expected to
suffer severely. The retabulation of the 1950 Survey of Consumer
Finances data for Part Three, Chapter 12, of this volume provides
useful information on this question. The division of nonfarm house-
holds into renters, home-owners with mortgages, and home-owners
without mortgages reveals consistent differences in leverage ratios far
greater than those encountered before.
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TABLE 52
FREQUENCY DISTRIBUTIONOF HOUSEHOLDS BY LEVERAGE RATIO


















(per cent of all households)
AND 1962
16 10 5 11 18. 40 100
100 — — — — — 100
100 — — — — — 100
46 0 3 1 50 100
27 5 8 5 60 100
17 8 21 11 43 100
7 11 13 8 61 100
3 7 8 23 59 100
1 6 17 35 .41 100
0 3 24 43 30 100
0 2 21 53 24 100











10 2 10 12 35 100
13 2 9 16 35 100
18 4 9 14 34 100
12 5 10 19 40 100
7 6 13 19 44 100
4 8 14 19 51 100
2 7 17 32 41 100
28 2 9 7 80 100
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7 6 9 17 45 100
6 6 11 25 41 100
10 4 14 25 87 100
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3 2 16 36 41 100
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12 2 5 8 37 100
9 1 1 10 80 49 100
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0 0.50 1.00 1.50
. to to to and
0.49 0.99 1.49 OverbTotal
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All Households 24 21 25 30 100
Position in IncomeDistribution,1961
Lowest quintile 47 18 25 10 100
Lowest tenth 53 12 29 6 100
Second tenth 40 24 21 15 100
Second quintile 29 23 23 25 100
Third quintile 26 18 22 84 100
Fourth quintile 8 20 27 45 100
Highest quintile 11 26 26 87 100
Ninth tenth 13 22 23 42 100
Highest tenth 8 31 80 31 100
Age 0/Head
18-24 40 14 16 30 100
25-34 25 12 15 48 100
35-44 13 14 28 45 100
45-54 17 24 34 25 100
55-64 25 33 31 11 100
65 and over 37 36 22 5 100
SouRcE: 1953: Data for all households and by income and occupation are from
.1953 Survey of Consumer Finances, Part IV, reprinted from Fed-
eralReserve Bulletin, September 1953, with supplementary tables.
Data by net worth and age of head are from unpublished tabula-
tions in Federal Reserve Board files.
1962: 1962 Survey ofConsumer Finances.
aPositivenet worth but no price-sensitive assets.
bIncludesthe6 per cent of all households who had price-sensitive assets and zero
or negative net worth.
Among all households, home-owners with mortgages showed, on the
average, adjusted leverage ratios of 1.15, home-owners without mort-
gages 0.78, and renters 0.58 (Table 53).Ownersof mortgaged homes
had the highest leverage ratios in every one of the twenty-one subdivi-
sions of the household sector, and in nineteen of them renters' ratios
were the lowest. Differences by housing status were far larger and more
consistent than those by age, income, or occupation. Almost half of
the subgroups of home-owners with mortgages had leverage ratios of
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TABLE 55
LEVERAGE RATIOS OF NONFARM HOUSEHOLDS OF DIFFERENT HOUSING STATUS. EARLY 1950
LEVERAGE RATIO






holds gages gagesRentersgages gagesRenters
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Total' .84 .78 1.15 .58 .95 1.37 .69
Income (dollars)
Under 1,000 .81 .78 1.17 .31 .96 1.44 .88
1,000 -1,999 .81 .79 1.25 .35 .98 1.54 .43
2,000 -2,999 .85 .71 1.62 .44 .84 1.91 .52
3,000 -5,999 .86 .79 1.25 .50 .92 1.45 .58
4,000- 4,999 .82 .72 1.13 .44 .88 1.38 .54
5,000 -7,499 .82 .68 1.21 .47 .83 1.48 .57
7,500 and over .86 .86 .97 .71 1.00 1.13 .83
Age of Head
18 -24 1.09 .87 1.60 .88 .80 1.47 .81
25 -34 1.04 .76 1.46 .64 .73 1.40 .62
35-44 .99 .83 1.17 .55 .89 1.26 .57
45 -54 .81 .77 1.09 .59 .95 1.35 .73
55-64 .81 .81 .93 .51 1.00 1.15 .63
65and over .73 .71 1.04 .53 .97 1.42 .73
Occupation
Professional and
semiprofessional .68 .53 1.03 .48 .78 1.51 .71
Self-employed .94 .91 1.11 .80 .97 .1.18 .85
Managerial .85 .76 1.01 .50 .89 1.19 .59
Clerical and sales .85 .79 1.47 .29 .93 1.73 .34
Skilled and semiskilled .90 .76 1.24 .37 .84 1.88 .41
Unskilled and service .84 .76 1.20 .35 .90 1.43 .42
Retired .73 .71 1.08 .77 .97 1.48 1.05
All other .80 .79 1.20 .38 .99 1.50 .48
SOURCE: Special tabulation of cards originating in 1950 Survey of Consumer
Finances. Data were adjusted to include life insurance and retirement funds among
assets.
aIncludinghouseholds for which income or age of head was not ascertained.
1.20 or more, while almost half of the renters' leverage ratios were
under 0.50 and only two groups of renters showed ratios as high as
0.80.
In the case of classification by income, the average leverage ratio
for all households varies only between a minimum of .88 for house-
holds with an income of less than $1,000 in 1950 to a maximum of 1.04
for those with an income between $4,000 and $4,999. The average
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leverage ratio for home-owners of all income levels with mortgage
debt, however, is twice as large as that for renters. The range extends
to almost 40 per cent even in the income class for which it is least
pronounced (over $7,500), and is over 200 per cent for the two lowest
income classes. Similarly, if households are arranged by the age of the
head, the leverage ratio for home-owners with mortgage debt is on the
average 80 per cent above that for both owners without mortgage debt
and renters. The range amounts to almost 100 per cent or more for
three of the six age classes (25 to 84; 35 to 44; and 65 and over). The
picture is similar for the classification by occupation of head. In the
most important classes(clerical and sales, skilled and semiskilled
workers, unskilled and service workers) the range between the two
extreme groups—home-owners with mortgage debt and renters—
amounts to more than 200 per cent. It remains below 100 per cent only.
in two groups, retired people and self-employed.
Table 53 suggests two conclusions. First, the leverage ratio of home-
owners with mortgage debt is always considerably above that of owners
without debt; it is considerably higher for both classes of owners than
for renters. Secondly, the difference in leverage ratio is less pronounced
for the higher income and wealth groups, and the corresponding occu-
pations. In these groups the ownership of stock partially offsets the
absence of home-ownership or home mortgage debt.
The classification by housing status thus has finally identified large
groups whose real net worth could be expected to fall or rise substan-
tially as a result of changes in the price level. Groups with an average
leverage ratio of less than .40 are found exclusively among renters,
particularly among renters in the lowest income group and renters
doing clerical or manual work. On the other hand, all groups of house-
holds with an average leverage ratio above unity own their homes, but
have mortgages on them. Among them the leverage ratios are highest
for households whose head is under 35, and for households with an
income of less than $4,000 in 1949.
From these leverage ratios, combined with the asset price data in
Chapter 11, inferences can be made about residual changes in net
worth (changes not due to saving) after 1949. We cannot compare
these inferences with the actual events, as was possible for the larger
sectors, but the projected changes in net worth are of interest in them-
selves.° The expected changes in net worth are shown in Table 54.
9 assumptionsunderlying these calculations should be emphasized. The pro-
jections relate to those families which were in the specified classes in 1949. Many
of them would have been classified differently in 1958; a family head was very
likely to have moved to the next higher age class in nine years, and his asset port.
folio could be expected to have changed correspondingly. Only initial asset struc-
tures are taken into account and it is assumed that the prices of each groups assets
of any type moved in conformity with the national index for that asset.
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TABLE 54
EXPECTED CHANGES IN WORTH OF HoUSEHOLDS, 1949-58, By INcoME, ACE,
OCCUPATION, AND HOUSING STATUS, CURRENT AND CONSTANT PRICES
(per cent)
CURRENT PRICES CONSTANT PRICES
Home-Owners Home-Owners
Without With Without With
MortgagesMortgagesRentersMortgagesMortgagesRenters
(1) (2) (8) (4) (5) (6)
Income (dollars)
Under 1,000 29 42 7 2 18 —15
1,000-1,999 28 41 8 2 12 —14
2,000 -2,999 28 54 20 2 23 —4
3,000-3,999 33 40 33 6 11 6
4,000-4,999 27 37 38 1 9 6
5,000-7,499 25 40 26 0 12 0
7,500 and over 61 58 62 28 26 29 •
Age of Head
18-24 28 48 22 2 18 —3
25-34 23 46 22 —2 16
5 28
—3
35-44 30 61 21 —4
45-54 31 40 54 4 11 23
55-64 42 34 34 13 7 7
65andover 49 38 76 19 10 40
Occupation
Professional and
semiprofessional 28 41 21 2 12 —4
Self-employed 42 58 62 13 26 29
Managerial 37 40 31 9 12 4
Clerical and sales 32 54 18 5 22 —6
Skilled and semiskilled27 40 10 1 12 —12
Unskilled and service 31 42 16 4 18 —8
Retired 52 37 187 21 9 88
SouRCE; Tables 39, 44, and 53.
Inmany respects these projections of net worth change reflect the
leverage ratios, as in the fact that owners of mortgaged homes presum-
ably fared best in fourteen out of twenty classes and renters worst in
eleven classes. However, renters were not consistently ill favored; those
at the highest income level, in older age groups, retired or self-
employed, had their low leverage ratios offset by favorable asset price
experience due to their ownership of common stocks. Because of the
importance of stock among renters' assets, the four largest projected
net worth changes appeared in groups of renters.
Even the influence of the age variable, which was most clearly related
to leverage ratios, is blurred by the introduction of asset price changes,
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because the youngest households own little stock. Presumably, those
who fared the best during this inflationary period in general,
owners of mortgaged homes, and, in upper income and age groups,
renters. Renters who had low incomes, blue collar, occupations, and
were young presumably suffered the most from price changes.
CONSUMERS UNION DATA: 1958
A new source of information on household leverage ratios has recently
become available: the survey of Consumers Union (CU) members con-
ducted by the National Bureau (under the direction of Thomas Juster)
and the Columbia University Anticipations Workshop (under the
direction of Professor Albert Hart).Thissurvey covers the end of 1958
and is thus much more recent than the SCF data for 1950 and 1953.
The CU survey therefore includes the effects of the greater part of the
postwar rise in stock prices. Furthermore, because the CU sample was
very large, 16,000 instead of the 3,000 used in the SCF, it is possible to
make additional cross tabulations, by income and age, for example, in-
stead of relying solely on gross relationships. The two sets of data are
separated by almost a decade of great changes in the economy, includ-
ing the rise in stock prices, and by considerable differences in methods
and in the population sampled. They therefore provide a test of
whether the relationships we have found are ephemeral or persistent,
mere incidental results of the choice of survey dates or true character-
istics of different types of families.
Some defects of the CU sample should be pointed out before describ-
ing the results. It is far from being a random sample of the population
of the United States such as the SCF attempts to achieve; Consumers
Union members have considerably higher incomes and more educa-
tion than the average and a higher proportion of them are home-
owners. As a result, the leverage ratios for all families combined may be
grossly distorted and we have, therefore, not made much use of them.
A more serious defect is that the question about ownership of assets
and liabilities was put in terms of very wide value ranges such as $5,000
to 10,000, $10,000 to 20,000, and $20,000 to 40,000. The items most
affected by the width of these intervals were houses and mortgage debt.
which were by far the main assets and liabilities for most families. As
a result, the information about owners of mortgaged homes included
here relates almost entirely to those who reported house values greater
than mortgage values, because it was impossible to calculate leverage
ratios for those reporting house and mortgage in the same size class.
Furthermore the excellent negative correlation between net worth and
leverage ratios is probably largely spurious: any error caused by using
the midpoint of one of these large classes for house value, for example,
(and the error can obviously be quite large) involves a corresponding
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error in the opposite direction in the leverage ratio. Because of this
defect we were unable to make much use of the net worth variable in
the CU data.
The relationships between income and leverage ratios and between
age and leverage ratios for all families (1953 and 1962) and by housing
status as well (1950 and 1958) are compared in Charts 17 and 18, with
encouraging results. Despite the lapse of time, despite the differences
between the populations studied and the questionnaires used, most of
the 1958 relationships are quite similar to those with adjusted leverage
ratios in 1950.
The stronger of the two variables, age of head of the household, is
studied in Table 55 and Chart 17. Even the leverage ratios for all
families combined show the same pattern in all four years: they first
rise with age until the early 1930's and then fall steadily. This pattern is
undoubtedly a result of the greater weight of renters in the lower age
TABLE 55




AGE OF HEAl) 1962 1953 1950FamiliesMortgages MortgagesRenters
18-24 1.28 1.15 1.01 .94 .87 1.60 .88
25 -34 1.47 1.18 1.19 1.07 .76 1.46 .64
35.44 1.35 1.06 1.03 .93 .83 1.17 .53
45 -54 1.09 .94 .92 .81 .77 1.09 .59
55- 64 .97 .90 .90 .82 .81 .93 .51
65 and over .82 .84 .83 .76 .71 1.04 .53
Under 25
1958b
.82 .74 1.31 .64
25 -29 .92 .79 1.22 .53
30 -34 .99 .82 1.22 .49
85-39 .96 .84 1.14 .50
40 -44 .88 .76 1.05 .44
45-49. .84 .77 1.00 .50
50 -54 .77 .71 .94 .57
55 -59 .75 .75 .89 .40
60-64 .72 .71 .84 .48
65 and over .70 .71 .81 .60
SOURCE: Table 51 and Consumers Union Survcy.
aAdjustedto include life insurance and retirement funds.
bIncludeslife insurance but not retirement funds.
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groups, of home-owners with mortgages in the middle groups, and, in
the upper age groups, the shift to debt-free home-ownership com-
bined with the fall in the leverage ratio among owners of mortgaged
homes.
In both 1950 and 1958 renters had the lowest leverage ratios and
owners of mortgage-free homes somewhat higher ones at every age. All
of the ratios were below unity. Also, in both years, owners of mortgaged
homes had the highest ratios. These fell steeply with age but remained
above 1 until past age 50. Renters showed falling leverage ratios in the
lower age groups, but little change and possibly some increase after
age 45, while mortgage-free home-owners' leverage ratios fell only
slightly, always remaining between .71 and .87, a much smaller range
than that of the other two groups.
The gross relationships between income and leverage ratios for all
families (Table 56 and Chart 18) were not as definite as those with
TABLE 56




INCOME All Mort- Mort-
(dollars) 1953 1950Familiesgages gages Renters
Under 1,000 .88 .98
1950'
.92 .76 1.17 .51
1,000-1,999 .92 .91 .85 .73 1.25 .55
2,000-2,999 .93 .95 .85 .65 1.62 .44
3,000-3,999 .95 1.01 .88 .79 1.25 .50
4,000-4,999 1.04 1.00 .85 .72 1.13 .44
5000-7,499 1.02 .96 .85 .68 1.21 .47
7,500 and Over .98 .92 .85 .86 .97 .71
Under 3,000
I
.69 .58 1.20 .38
3,000-8,900 .76 .72 1.11 .89
4,000-4,900 .78 .66 1.16 .39
5,000-7,400 .86 .73 1.13 .36
7,500-9,900 .90 .71 1.14 .38
10,000-14,900 .88 .71 1.08 .49
15,000-24,900 .84 .75 .97 .60
25,000 and over .78 .79 1.07 .66
SouRcE: Table 51 and Consumers Union Survey.
'Adjusted to include life insurance and retirement funds.
bIncludeslife insurance but not retirement funds.
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CHART 17
Leverage Ratios by Housing Status and Age,
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Source: Table 56 and 1962 Survey of Consumer Finances. The 1962 data were
shown in the source only by. income quintiles. They were plotted here using crude
estimates of average income for each quintile. Other data were plotted at the
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age. The adjusted 1950 data suggest no relationship at all, and thein-
adjusted1950 figures only a faint one. But unadjusted ratios for 1953
and 1962 and adjusted ones for 1958 indicate a rise in leverage ratios
as income increases up to a certain point and a fall thereafter.
Within housing classes, there does seem to be fairly clear association
between income and leverage ratios. Among home-owners with mort-
gages, the relationship was a negative one: the highest ratios appeared
at lower incomes and the ratios fell irregularly as income increased,
but remained with a single exception, above one. For renters and
owners of nonmortgaged homes, leverage ratios increased with income,
mildly in the case of the latter group but quite strongly among the
renters, particularly at higher incomes. At every income level, renters
had the lowest leverage ratios and home-owners without mortgages
somewhat higher ones, but no income classes in these two housing
groups had ratios above .86. Home-owners with mortgages had the
highest ratios at every income level but the spread among the housing
groups diminished with higher income as it did with age.
The 1958 relationships were found to be similar to those of 1950
between: (1) leverage ratios and housing status within income classes;
(2) leverage ratios and housing status within age classes;(3) leverage.
ratios and income within housing status classes; (4) leverage ratios and
age within housing status classes. This suggests that these relationships
are by considerable changes in economic conditions and that
the findings of further exploration of the 1958 Consumers Union
sample would apply beyond that year and that population.
Up to this point we have confirmed the main findings from the 1950
SCF data but we have not gone beyond them. The CU survey, however,
permits us to examine not only the gross associations between leverage
ratios and income or age, but also to test whether each shows a net
association with the leverage ratio when the other has been taken
account of.
Age appears to be of considerable independent importance as a vária-
ble only among owners of mortgaged homes (Chart 19). Groups of
those under 50 years of age (more than two-thirds of the total) had
leverage ratios considerably above unity, while the older ones fell
almost to the level of the owners of mortgage-free homes. Among the
latter group and among the renters, the age variable had no clearly
visible influence. If there was any relationship, it was in a negative
direction.
Income, like age, seems to be related to leverage ratios in much the
same way as in the gross figures (Chart 20). The relation with income
was negative for home-owners with mortgages but positive for the other
two, particularly at the upper incomes.
224LEVERAGERATIOS
CHART19






















ratios above 1 have been found only among
the oldest
the higher income levels, frequently had
home-owners were heavily concentrated at leverage










































homes. Even among them, families,
lowerINFLUENCEOF PRICE CHANGESON NET WORTH
CHART 20













all had ratiosbetween 0.6 and 0.9. Almostall the renter groups had
leverage ratios below 0.5, with the higher income classes better off in
this respect than the poorer ones.
It is desirable to add wealth,
explanatory variable.
or net worth, to our analysis as an
226
that come to light are
Leveroae ratio
14































3 4 5 6 7
Income code
3 4 5 6 7
Income code
8 I 2 3 4 5 6 7
Income code
But any relationshipsLEVERAGE RATIOS
ambiguous because errors in net worth can be expected to show a
strong negative correlation with errors in leverage ratios.
The data for renters should be comparatively free of distortion on
this account. They do, however, have adifferentdisadvantage: since
the sample is heavily weighted with home-owners, the renter cells are
reduced to small numbers when many variables are used, and the
leverage ratios become erratic.. This is particularly true for the lowest
net worth group and we have therefore excluded it from our discussion
here.
The data, which have not been reproduced here, show some net
relationship between age and leverage ratios, and it appears to be
negative, as in Chart 19. But the positive association between income
and the leverage ratios (Chart 20) largely disappears when wealth (or
net worth) is introduced as a variable. The data behave too erratically
for any firm conclusion but they suggest the possibility that some of the
gross relationships between income and leverage ratios may be explain-
able in terms of net worth.
If we examine the other housing status classes, keeping in mind the
danger of spurious results, we find that among home-owners without
mortgages, as one might guess from Charts 19 and 20, neither age nor
income appeared to be related to leverage ratios, even when net worth
was held constant. And net worth itself (unless a spurious negative
correlation concealed a genuine positive one) seemed to be unrelated
to leverage when the other variables were eliminated.
Among owners of mortgaged homes, on the other hand, there was a
very strong negative association between net worth and leverage. Even
with net worth held constant, leverage ratios appeared to be influenced
by age and income. The decline in leverage ratio with increasing age,
after the effect of wealth had been removed, was in the same direction
as, but weaker than, the one shown in Chart 19. The effect of income,
however, was completely reversed. In Chart 20 higher incomes for
owners of mortgaged homes were associated with substantially smaller
leverage ratios. Once the influence of net worth was removed, higher
income became associated with higher ratios.
One relationship survived the introduction of the net worth variable
without alteration. In 131 out of 133 cells (subdivisions of the total
into age, income, and net worth cross classifications), owners of mort-
gaged homes had higher leverage ratios than owners of mortgage-free
homes and, in all seventy-one possible comparisons, owners of mortgage-
free homes showed higher leverage ratios than renters.
Wealth, although it did not alter the direction of this association,
did apparently affect its slope. The leverage ratio fell much more
steeply from one housing status class to the next within the lower
wealth groups than among the upper ones.
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Some further results could probably be extracted from these data by
a more intensive effort to remove the influence of the wide house and
mortgage value classes. But it would probably not be worth while ex-
pending too much energy in this direction because the next survey of
CU members, covering the end of 1959, eliminated the problem by
asking for specific values instead of wide intervals. Analysis of this sur-
vey, when the basic data are available, would probably add consid
erably to the precision of our knowledge, particularly on the influence
of wealth. But it seems unlikely that• the conclusions drawn here re-
garding the associations between leverage ratios and age, income, and
housing status, disregarding the influence of wealth, will be greatly
altered by the improved data.
LEVERAGE RATIOS OF UPPER. WEALTH GROUPS
Tabulations of estate tax returns, available since the early 1920's, are
of great importance in studying the effects of price level changes on the
distribution of wealth because they provide the only comprehensive
information available on the asset structure and the leverage ratios of
households in the upper wealth groups, and thus, by inference, of
households in the upper income groups. This use of estate tax returns
is possible because individuals of a given age who die in a given year
and leave estates in excess of the taxable minimum (through most of
the period $60,000) may be regarded 'as a sample of all individuals of
the same age and wealth alive during that year. It is therefore possible,
provided estate tax returns are cross-classified by age of decedent and
size of estate, to derive from them, with the help of estate tax multi-
pliers(the reciprocals of age-specific death rates), estimates of the
wealth of all individuals in a given age group with assets above the
exemption. The age groups can be combined to obtain estimates of
total wealth, classified by size of estate, for individuals with estates
above the exemption limit. Estate tax returns by size of estate
but not by age of decedent can be used only with reservations since
asset structure and debt ratios vary with age. Unfortunately estate tax
returns have been tabulated in the needed only for 1944 and
195S. These tabulations were utilized by and Lamp-
man in developing, for these two years, of the wealth of all
persons with estates above $60,000, classified either by age of owner or
by size of estate. These studies estimated not only the aggregate value
of estates but also that of the main assets and liabilities distinguished
in the returns. The leverage ratios calculated from these two estimates
are shown in Tables 57 and 58.
On the basis of estate tax returns, the leverage ratio for the estate
tax population (individuals with estates of more than $60,000) ap-
pears to have risen from 0.70 in 1944 to 0.77 in 1953. The latter ratio
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TABLE 57





















60 to 80 .71 .02 .39 .29 .68 .02 .30 .85
80 to 100 .76 .02 .41 .38 .68 .02 .29 .38
100 to 150 .76 .02 .35 .88 .70 .02 .26 .42
150 to 200 .78 .02 .33 .42 .70 .02 .20 .48
200 to 300 .81 .02 .30 .49 .71 .02 .19 .49
300 to 500 .81 .02 .22 .57 .77 .01 .16 .59
500 to 1,000 .79 .02 .15 .61 .75 .01 .12 .61
1,000 to 2,000 .80 .01 .11 .68 .66 .02 .10 .54
2,000 to 5,000 .74 .02 .10 .62 .70 .01 .05 .64
5,000 and over .70 .003 .02 .68 .53 .01 .05 .47
Total .77 .02 .25 .50 .70 .02 .18 .50
SouRcE: 1953: From Robert Lampman The Share of Top Wealth-Holders in Na-
tional Wealth, 1922-56 (Princeton for NBER, 1962), Table 24, p.
52. It was assumed that the sum of tangible personal property and
interest in unincorporated business was two-thirds of the figure for
miscellaneous property, and that tangible personal property was
13.7 per cent of miscellaneous property, as in 1949 Statistics of
Income data.
1944: Mendershausen's data from Goldsmith, Study of Saving, Vol. III,
p. 365.
'Corporate stock and interest in unincorporated business.
is substantially lower than the ratio(0.90)for all households with
assets of over $25,000 calculated from the Survey of Consumer Finances
sample (Table 51). The explanation of this discrepancy does not
appear to be that one ratio applies to families with assets over $25,000
and the other to families over $60,000, because the 1950 data indicate
that these two groups have similar leverage ratios. But the gap can be
partly accounted for by other factors. One is that the 1953 SCF data
are unadjusted for insurance and pension fund assets. Data for 1950
suggest that correction for this Omission would bring the 1953 SCF
ratio down to about 0.85 (Table 51). Another is that the estate tax
data include assets such as state, municipal, corporate bonds,
mortgages, and notes, all of which are omitted from the SCF data.
Removing these from the estate tax data brings that leverage ratio up
to approximately 0.84, almost identical with the adjusted leverage ratio
from the SCF. It therefore does not seem likely that the two sets of
data are seriously incompatible.
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TABLE 58
















20 to 30 .79 .03 .11 .65 .70 .01 .18 .52
30 to 40 .88 .02 .22 .64 .71 .02 .21 .48
40 to 50 .78 .03 .26 .49 .75 .02 .19 .54
50 to 55 .79 .02 .30 .47 .74 .01 .18 .54
55 to 60 .77 .02 .28 .46 .64 .01 .17 .45
60 to 65 .74 .02 .27 .46 .70 .01 .20 .48
65 to 70 .72 .01 .28 .48 .64 .01 .15 .47
70 to 75 .71 .01 .21 .49 .69 .01 .17 .51
75 to 80 .72 .01 .21 .50 .66 .01 .17 .47
80 to 85 .71 .01 .20 .50 .63 .01 .16 .46
85 and over .71 .01 .20 .50 .58 .01 .14 .43
Total .77 .02 .25 .50 .70 .02 .18 .50
SouRcE: 1958: Lampman, Share of Top Wealth-Holders, Table 23, p. 51. It was
assumed that the sum of tangible personal property and interest in
unincorporated business was two-thirds of the figure for miscel-
laneous property, and that tangible personal property was 13.7
per cent of miscellaneous property, as in 1949 Statistics of Income
data.
1944: Mendershausen's data in Goldsmith, Study of Saving, Vol. III, p. 371.
aCorporatestock and interest in unincorporated business.
The relation between wealth and leverage ratios is, as we have seen
earlier from the SCF data, quite different for the two main types of
price-sensitive assets (Table 57). The consumer capital goods ratio—
based on tangible personal property and homes, which apparently
account for most of real estate—shows a clearly negative correlation
with size of estate. It declines in 1944 from over 0.30 for estates of
$60,000 to $80,000 to 0.06 for the top wealth groups. The business
equity ratio, in contrast, rises fairly regularly from barely for
estates between $60,000 and $80,000 to three-fifths for those between
$300,000 and $1,000,000, but then falls to slightly less than one-half for
the top group of estates of more than $5,000,000. The level and shape
of the curve is quite similar in 1953.10 Hence the course of stock prices,
101n comparing the levels of 1953 with those of 1944, it must be kept in mind
that an estate of the same dollar value had a considerably lower purchasing power or
rank in 1953 than in 1944, since the general price level as well as the prices of
stocks and real estate approximately doubled as did the value of all estates over
$60,000, or the value of the top percentage of estates. Hence, for example, the
estate class of $300,000 to $500,000 in 1944 should be compared with the classes of
$500,000 to $1,000,000 in 1953.
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which dominate the business equity ratio, becomes increasingly the
decisive factor in net worth changes the higher we go in the wealth
scale, except possibly for estates of more than $5,000,000 among which
the proportion of monetary assets increases as a result of accumulation
of tax-exempt securities.
There is even less variation in the leverage ratio among owners of
different ages(Table 58). In 1944, apart from some occasional
variation that may be due to the small number in the sample in some
of the lower, age groups, the leverage ratio was around 0.70; showing no
definite trend up to age 65 or even 75. It is only in the very highest
age groups that the leverage ratio declines sharply to, less than 0.60
among estate owners of over 85 years. This decline may be due to
anticipation of death which leads to liquidation of stockholdings and
acquisition of assets, particularly government bonds, that can be sold
more easily without affecting the market and, what may be more im-
portant, at prices that can be fairly well anticipated.
Estate. tax returns unadjusted for age distribution are available for
many other years. However, they must be used cautiously, for the
reasons mentioned earlier, in judging relationships between wealth and
leverage ratios. Fortunately, data for the two years in which unad-
justed and adjusted ratios can be compared suggest that the differences
do not render the unadjusted data valueless (Table 59). In both years
levels of the leverage ratios are higher in the adjusted data, particularly
in lower wealth brackets. The unadjusted and adjusted relationships
of leverage ratios to wealth are, however, sufficiently alike to permit
the drawing of rough inferences about the two decades before 1944.
TABLE 59
CoMPAinsoN OF LEVERAGE RATIOS DERIvED FROM ESTATE TAX RETURNS,





Unadjusted Adjusted Unadjusted Adjusted
dollars) (1) (2) (3) (4)
60 to 100 .66 .74 .61 .68
100 to 200 .69 .77 .61 .70
200 to 300 .71 .81 .63 .71
300 to 500 .74 .81 .65 .77
500 to 1,000 .75 .79 .66 .75
1,000 to 2,000 .74 .80 .59 .66
2,000 to 5,000 .76 .74 .70 .70
5,000 and over .67 .70 .53 .53
Total .70 .77 .63 .70
SOURCE; Table 57 and underlying sources.
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One point that stands out clearly about the trends in estate tax
holdings is that the leverage ratio for estates over $60,000 increased
during the 1920's and 1950's and declined sharply between 1929 and
1939 (Table 60 and Chart 21) •11 This is just what would have been
expected as the result of the spectacular increase in absolute and rela-
tive prices of stocks from 1922 to 1929 and 1949 to 1958, and the decline
in stock and real estate prices between 1929 and 1939. The sharp in-
crease in the leverage ratio 1944 and 1953 is corroborated by
the calculations reproduced in Table 57, based on adjusted estate tax
returns, and was to be expected in view Of the sharp rise in price-
sensitive assets.
Since the level of leverage ratios for all estates of over $60,000 is
reasonable and is confirmed by the adjusted figures where checks are
possible, we may have some confidence in the differences in leverage
TABLE60
LEVERAGERATIOS FOR SIzE,CALCULATEDDrnEcrrY FROM





















200 to 300 .68 .68 .64 .68 .65 .74
300 to500 .71 .71 .65 .65 .67 .74 .76.:
500 to 1,000 .70 .76 .65 .66 .68 .75 .78
1,000 to 2,000 .72 .77 .64 .59 .70 .74 .78
2,000 to 5,000 .73 .75 .66 .70 .70 .76 .78
5,000 and over .63 .76 .62 .53 .68 .67 .79
All size dasses .71 .74 .65 .63 .66 .70 .74
SouRcE: 1922-44: Mendershausen's data inGoldsmith, Studyof Saving, Vol.III,
pp.324-827.
1949-58: Calculated from Statistics of Income, various issues.
*Valueof price-sensitive assets was calculated as follows:
1922, 1929: Real estate, corporate stock, and one-half of "unclassified assets."
1939: Real estate, tangible personal property, corporate stock, and one-half of
"other intangible assets."
1944, 1949: Real estate, tangible personal property, corporate stock, and interest
in unincorporated business.
1953, 1958: Real estate, corporate stock, and two-thirds of "other property."
1)Under $150,000.
$150,000 to $200,000.
11 ofthe fluctuations in Table 60 may be due to peculiarities in the method
of calculation. Interest in unincorporated business enterprises and tangible personal
property were not separately reported in every year and were estimated very roughly.
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CHART21
Leverage Ratios of Estates, by Size of Net Estate, 1922-58
1958
ratiosamong estates of different size, keeping in mind that over time
an equivalent estate has been going up considerably in dollar value.
Iii all years selected in Table 60, there is a modest increase in the lever-
age ratio from estates of under $100,000 to those in the $2,000,000: to
$5,000,000 class and in most cases a rather sharp decline as the top
class of estates of more than $5,000,000 is reached. The main deviations
from this pattern are in 1929 and 1958 and they are not, radicaL Both
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1922 1929 1939 1944 1949 1953
Source:Table60.INFLUENCE OF PRICE CHANGES ON NET WORTH
years followed periods of rapid increases in stock prices which may
have pushed estates rapidly from the lower wealth classes, with invest-
ment portfolios customarily more heavily weighted with common
stock, into the top wealth class, whose previous members had leaned
more toward tax-exempt securities.
Leverage Ratios for Groups of Corporations
In view of the abundance of balance sheet data for corporations, the
calculation of leverage ratios for relatively narrow and homogeneous
groups of them would seem to offer a broad field for the analysis of the
effects of price level changes on business net worth. Unfortunately1
virtually all tabulations of corporate balance sheets are based on book
values of assets and net worth.'2
What is required is a set of estimates of replacement costs of plant
and equipment, by industry, which covers a considerable period of
time including the postwar decade and can be substituted for the book
values shown in balance sheets for the same groups of corporations.
This substitution permits the calculation of the current value of total
assets and hence of the current value of net worth and of the leverage
ratio.13
There are about two dozen manufacturing industries for which
Daniel Creamer has prepared such estimates for a number of bench-
mark dates.14 No material was found which would have permitted the
calculation of leverage ratios by size of corporation on the basis of the
12 average balance sheets might still be used to study differences in the
leverage ratios by industry or size of company, provided it could be assumed that
the ratio of market value to book value of net worth, which is essentially determined
by the ratio for plant and equipment, did not vary. This assumption cannot be
made, however, because the age distribution of plant and equipment of different
groups of corporations is not the same. Therefore a uniform adjustment factor can-
not be used to shift plant and equipment from book value to replacement cost.
As has been mentioned, there is an alternative approach to the measurement of
the current value of net worth for corporations, namely, the use of the market
value of the stock•. This method has not been used here because it cannot be ap-
plied to other sectors, and its results are not directly comparable with those for other
sectors. Furthermore, it would be quite difficult to collect the required information
for industries or other groups of corporations rather than for individual companies,
as has been done.
13• approach ignores differences between book value and current value in all
other balance sheet items. These are generally of relatively, small importance for
broad industrial groups, although they are certainly not negligible in the case of
inventories (Since the spread of LIFO accounting) and of intercorporate stockhold-
ings. The leverage ratios shown in Table 61 are therefore slightly too low and their
movements are probably somewhat less pronounced than they would be had it
been possible to make allowance for the difference between book and market value
of inventories and for intercorporate stockholdings.
14notes to Table 61.
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replacement cost rather than the book value of assets and net worth.
Probably the outstanding feature of Table 61, which shows the
leverage ratio for about twenty individual manufacturing industries for
five benchmark dates between 1929 and 1959, is the relatively small
amount of variation among industries and over time. For all manufac-
turing industries taken together, the leverage ratio for the five bench-
mark dates extending over thirty years—although not including a year
of deep depression—varied only between 0.96 and 1.04. For the entire
period an upward trend in the ratio may be detected, but it is not pro-
nounced or uninterrupted.
The range of leverage ratios for individual industries is naturally
much wider, extending between 0.77 and The lack of wide differ-
ences is evident in the frequency distribution of the ninety-eight lever-
age ratios shown in Table 61. Only eleven are below 0.90 and sixteen in
excess of 1.09. The remaining seventy-one ratios are concentrated in the
range from 0.90 to 1.09 and are divided almost equally between the
0.90 to 0.99 and the 1.00 to 1.09 intervals. This means that in three-
fourths of the cases the difference in either direction between monetary
assets and liabilities ampunts to less than one-tenth of net worth.
Estimates of the current (replacement) value of plant and equip-
ment are also available for half a dozen utility industries,15 but these
industries cannot be matched with sufficient accuracy with data from
Statistics of Income to calculate leverage ratios except for all public
utilities together and for transportation separately.'6 For these groups
the ratios are as follows:
All Public Transpor. Other Public
Utilities tation Utilities
1929 1.61
1939 2.48 8.04 2.05
1951 1.51 1.35 1.69
The leverage ratios for public utilities thus have been considerably
above unity and above those for manufacturing industries. The rise
between 1929 and 1939 and the decline between 1939 and 1951 (the
last year for which Ulmer's estimates are available) reflect the decline
and rise in the level of prices accompanied first by a small increase and
then by a sharp reduction in the debt ratio. The much sharper fall in
the leverage ratio of the transportation industries reflects primarily the
inability of the railroads to use debt financing to a substantial extent.
15MelvilleJ. Ulmer, Capital in Transportation, Communications, and Public
Utilities: its Formation and Financing, Princeton for NBER, 1960.
16Withadditional work, such matching could probably be achieved for several
additional utility industries on the basis of data in the unpublished source book of
Statistics of Income, reportsto regulatory commissions, and published balance
sheets.
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TABLE 61
LEVERAGERATIOSFOR MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES, 1929-59
S 1929 1937 1948 1953 1959
All Manufacturing .96 1.00 .99 1.03 1.04
Beverages 1.12 1.17 1.11 1.07
Food and kindred products .96 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.06


























Printing and publishing .80 .78 .92 .92 .87
Chemicals and allied products
















Leather and products .84 .94 .88 .97 1.01
Stone, glass, and clay products .96 .99 .94 .93 .97
Primary metals 1.00 1.13 1.11
Fabricated metal products .93 .99 1.02










Other transportation equipment .92 1.26 1.88
Motor vehicles .83 .86 .97 .96
Instruments








1929-48: Structures and equipment from Daniel Creamer, Sergei Dobrovoisky, and
Israel Borenstein, Capital in Manufacturing and Mining: ItsFormation
and Financing (Princeton for NBER, 1960). Data in 1929 prices, given in
Table A-S, are converted to current values using a price index for capital
derived by dividing capital in Current prices by capital in 1929 prices.
Capital in current prices was estimated by multiplying the current price
capital-to-output ratio(Table. 11,col.8)by output in current prices
(Table A-b).
Other assets and liabilities are from Statistics of income, Part 2, various
issues. Data for corporations submitting balance sheets were raised to cover
all corporations by the ratios for compiled receipts; from Statistics of
Income, and the resulting figures were raised again to cover all establish-
ments by Census of Manufactures ratios taken from Creamer's worksheets.
1953, 1959: Daniel Creamer, Capital Expansion and Capacity in Postwar Manu-
facturing and Recent Changes in ManufacturingCapacity (NationalIn-
dustrial Conference Board, Studies in Business Economics, Nos. 72 and 79,
New York, 1961 and 1962). Capital in 1929 and 1954 prices was converted
to current values by using a price index for capital composed of the
Turner Construction Cost Index (from. various issues of Statistical A b-
stract of the United States) and the price index underlying deflated dur-
able producer goods (Suwey of Current Business, July 1962, and U.S.
Income and Output), weighted equally.
Other assets and liabilities from Statistics of income as for earlier years.
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No figures are available to calculate leverage ratios of corporations of
different sizes as we lack data on the current values of their assets and
net worth. Some idea of this relationship can, however, be obtained if
we assume that the relation between current and market value of assets
is the same for all size groups. Although probably not correct, this
assumption may not be so far from the facts that the unadjusted figures
are without any value. Of the voluminous material provided by the
tabulations of corporate income tax returns in Statistics of Income that
could be used for this purpose, data on nine major industry groups (all
excluding financei7) are shown in Table 62 and Chart 22 for 1956,
while additional data on durable and nondurable manufacturing
rations are.shown for 1958 and 1962 in Table 63 because they are more
recent and separate the information on the very largest corporations.
The relationship between size and leverage ratio obviously varies
considerably among industries, as is evident from Chart 22.Thisvaria-
tion would be even more pronounced if the calculations had been made
for smaller and more homogeneous industry groups than the nine broad
sectors covered here. There nevertheless appear to be at least two
common tendencies. First,. in most of the major industry groups there
is a sharp decline in the leverage ratio between the smallest group,
which includes corporations with less than $25,000 of assets, and the
next group, containing corporations with assets of between $25,000
and $50,000. This decline appears not only in the ratio of all price.
sensitive assets to net worth but also in the components, i.e., the ratios
of fixed assets to net worth and of inventories to net worth. This
decline is due to the low net worth-asset ratio for these small corpora-
tions, which in turn reflects the existence of a surplus deficit (or even
negative total net worth) in a substantial proportion of them. Secondly,
the leverage ratio declines for the largest asset size group in all indus-
tries except construction and wholesale trade.
Over the largest part of the range, i.e., between the smallest and the
largest size groups of corporations, the major industry groups, however,
show a substantial variation in pattern. In four of the nine groups
(public utilities, services, wholesale trade, and real estate), the leverage
ratio increases throughout this range. In others, the curve is U-shaped,
the leverage ratio being lowest for corporations with assets between
$1,000,000 and $10,000,000. This is the case in manufacturing, the
largest of the nine groups, and in retail trade. Finally, in three groups,
1TFinandal corporations other than real estate(as well as undassified corpora-
tions) have been excluded because they do not lend themselves well to the cal-
culation of leverage ratios from the balance sheets that accompany their income
tax returns. Most of the price-sensitive assets of financial corporations are common
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* Leverage negative for asset size under $25,000.
mining, and construction).
The more, recent data in Table 63 confirm the relationship between
size of firm and leverage shown in Table 62 for manufacturing.





o o — —
o00
the general tendency of the leverage ratiois downward(agriculture,.LEVERAGE RATIOS
TABLE 63






1958 1962 1958 1962
All sizes .95 .96 .96 .97 .95 .96








1,000 to 5,000 .86 .94
5,000 to 10,000 .81 .91











250,000 to 1,000,000 1.08 1.08 •
1,000,000 and over .88 .88
SouRcE: Quarterly Financial Report for Manufacturing Corporations, Fourth
Quarter 1958, and Fourth Quarter 1962, FrC-SEC, pp. 22ff and 50ff.
a Sum of net property, plant and equipment, and inventories; divided by stock-
holders' equity.
crease culminating in a peak just below the largest firms, and another
decline when the largest size is reached.
Without more detailed investigation, it is not possible to affinn or
deny the existence of a definite correlation between size, and level of
leverage ratio for corporations or all business enterprises. It is very
doubtful, however, whether such a correlation, if it exists, is either of
a simple pattern Or generally applicable to a wide range of industries.
While it is impossible to say to what extent substitution of current
values for book values of plant and equipment in Tables 62 and 63 and
inclusion of intercorporate stockholdings in Table 63 would alter the
relation between size and leverage ratio, it is likely that these adjust-
ments would increase the level of the leverage ratio for large manufac-
turing corporations more than for small- and medium-sized ones.18
This inference is based on two facts:(1) intercorporate stockholdings
are more important for large than for small corporations; and (2) the
excess of current over book value of assets is likely to be proportionately
higher for large than for small' manufacturing corporations since their
tangible assets consist to a larger extent of equipment and plant, on
which the difference between current and book value is likely to be
higher than on inventories which account for a higher proportion of
price-sensitive assets among small- and medium-sized manufacturing
corporations.
181n comparing the levels of the leverage ratios in Table 63 with other data, it
is well to keep in mind that the numerator excludes intercorporate stockholdings.
This tends to decrease the calculated value of the leverage ratio.
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